

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 06277 01 OF 02 271414Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----050672 271427Z /42

O 271358Z FEB 78
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6035

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 06277

EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

JERUSALEM FOR USDEL ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR EG IS US
SUBJECT: SADAT'S ORAL MESSAGE TO BEGIN

REF: (A) STATE 49705, (B) CAIRO 6274, (C) CAIRO 6202,
(D) TEL AVIV 2577, (E) JERUSALEM 524, (F) STATE 29698

1. SINCE WE NOW HAVE SADAT'S AGREEMENT THAT DELIVERY OF ORAL MESSAGE BE DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER ROY HAS HAD OPPORTUNITY TALK AGAIN WITH SADAT, WE SHOULD CONSIDER HOW BEST TO HANDLE UPCOMING DISCUSSION. FOLLOWING ARE SOME OF MY THOUGHTS ON THE SUBJECT.

2. FIRST, WHILE THE SADAT ORAL MESSAGE IS STRONG IN CONTENT AND WORDING, IT IS A TRUE REFLECTION OF SADAT'S CURRENT ATTITUDE. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT BEGIN'S CURRENT VIEW OF SADAT IS, BUT SADAT FEELS THAT THE ISRAELI PRIMIN HAS FAILED TO RESPOND TO HIS JERUSALEM INITIATIVE AND REMAINS ESSENTIALLY AN IDEOLOGUE. IN HIS PRESENT MOOD, SADAT IS QUITE READY TO TALK TO BEGIN IN THIS WAY. DESPITE THIS, I THINK SADAT WOULD BE RECEPTIVE, IF THE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 06277 01 OF 02 271414Z

ISSUE IS PUT TO HIM IN TERMS THAT WE UNDERSTAND HIS FRUSTRATIONS, TO THE SUGGESTION THAT SOME WORDING CHANGES WOULD BE HELPFUL TO US IN ORDER TO SET THE STAGE FOR BEGIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. IN DOING SO, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO MAKE SOME SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS. WE WILL WANT TO BE CAREFUL IN DOING SO, SINCE I THINK WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT SADAT HAS MISGIVINGS THAT WHEN BEGIN COMES TO

U.S. WE WILL IN FACT WAVER. HE IS LIKELY TO READ ANY SUGGESTIONS WE MAY MAKE IN THIS CONTEXT UNLESS ONCE AGAIN REASSURED THAT WE INTEND TO PRESS BEGIN AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS ON THE ISSUE OF THE SINAI SETTLEMENTS AND THE APPLICABILITY OF 242 TO ALL FRONTS.

3. ON THE MATTER OF WHETHER OR NOT SINAI II EXPIRES IN OCTOBER, 1978, THIS WILL HAVE TO BE HANDLED WITH GREAT CARE. IT IS A DEEPLY INGRAINED CONCEPT WHICH HE HAS HAD (AND ANNOUNCED) FROM THE MOMENT SINAI II WAS SIGNED, ALTHOUGH I DOUBT THAT HE HAS EVER READ THE PERTINENT DOCUMENTS. THE NOTION HAS BECOME EVEN STRONGER IN HIS MIND, SINCE IT HAS NEVER BEEN CHALLENGED BY HIGH-LEVEL USG OFFICIALS, INCLUDING MOST RECENTLY IN WASHINGTON WHEN HE MENTIONED THE MATTER AT THE SECRETARY'S LUNCH. I THINK ROY SHOULD POINT OUT TO HIM, AS I HAVE, THAT WE UNDERSTAND HIS CONCERN, BUT THAT THE ISRAELIS DO NOT AGREE THAT SINAI II EXPIRES IN OCTOBER, 1978, AND POINT TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE AGREEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR CASE. MORE-OVER, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, IT IS HARDLY IN GOE'S INTEREST TO CONTEND THAT THE AGREEMENT EXPIRES IN OCTOBER, 1978, OR EVEN HIS COMMITMENT AUTOMATICALLY TO RENEW UNEF. DOING SO WOULD SIMPLY PROVIDE GROUNDS FOR ISRAEL TO CONTEND THAT SOME OR ALL ASPECTS OF SINAI II BENEFICIAL TO EGYPT, E.G. WITHDRAWAL FROM GIDDI AND MITLA PASSES, HAVE BEEN NULLIFIED BY THE EGYPTIAN ACTION. WE COULD ADD THAT AS SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 06277 01 OF 02 271414Z

DRAFTERS OF THE BASIC AGREEMENT (AND THIS IS THE TRICKIEST PART), WE TOO CONSIDER SINAI II TO BE IN EFFECT UNTIL SUPERCEDED BY A NEW AGREEMENT AND VIEW THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF SINAI II AS A NECESSARY SPRINGBOARD FOR MOVEMENT ON A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT. THE POINT IS THAT SADAT'S "FACE" IS DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER AND WE HAVE TO FIND A WAY OF LETTING HIM DOWN GENTLY.

4. SINCE I DID NOT HEAR BEGIN'S DECEMBER STATEMENT ABOUT ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY NOT EXCEEDING THE 67 BORDERS, I CANNOT COMMENT ON IT. IT WAS APPARENTLY MENTIONED TO SADAT IN WASHINGTON, HOWEVER, AND HE HAS LATCHED ON TO IT AS EVIDENCED BY ITS INCLUSION IN HIS ORAL MESSAGE. HE CLEARLY REGARDS IT AS APPLICABLE TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS WELL AS SINAI. IF WE ARE GOING TO ASK THAT THIS PHRASE BE DROPPED, WE WOULD DO WELL TO SUGGEST AN ALTERNATIVE INDICATING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF 242 TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

5. I SHARE THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF ROY INTERPRETED TO BEGIN WHAT SADAT MEANS WHEN HE SAYS THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE MOVING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION. THIS IS

THE ESSENCE OF SADAT'S CURRENT DISSATISFACTION AND IS, IN MY VIEW, NOT INCONSISTENT WITH SADAT'S GOING ALONG WITH ROY'S MISSION IN TRYING TO WORK OUT A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. SADAT IS WELL AWARE THAT THE CHANCES OF GETTING AN AGREED DECLARATION PRIOR TO BEGIN'S VISIT ARE SLIM, HENCE HE DOES NOT VIEW ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON ROY'S MISSION AS GENUINE POSITIVE MOVEMENT. SADAT IS A CONCEPTUALIST AND PRECISION IS NOT ONE OF HIS STRONG SUITS; HENCE, IT IS ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO PIN HIM DOWN. STILL, PERHAPS WITH THE HELP OF KAMEL, WE CAN PERSUADE SADAT TO BE A BIT MORE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 06277 02 OF 02 271415Z

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

-----050678 271427Z /50

O 271358Z FEB 78

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE

SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6036

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 CAIRO 06277

EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

PRECISE ABOUT THE MEANING OF HIS COMMENT THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE MOVING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION.

6. THE LINKING OF SINAI AND PALESTINIAN SETTLEMENTS, IN TERMS OF LIMITING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY SINAI SETTLEMENT UNTIL SOMETHING IS WORKED OUT FOR THE WEST BANK/GAZA, IS ALSO AN OLD CONCEPT WITH SADAT. ROY MIGHT EXPLAIN TO SADAT THAT DOING SO IN HIS ORAL MESSAGE TO BEGIN COULD HARDEN THE ISRAELI POSITION ON SINAI AND THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO DELETE THAT PASSAGE ALTOGETHER.

7. ON THE OTHER CONTRADICTIONS IN SADAT'S ORAL MESSAGE, AS POINTED OUT BY ROY, I SEE NO REASON WHY THESE POINTS SHOULD NOT BE MENTIONED TO SADAT WITH A REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION. EILTS

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS, PEACE PLANS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 27 feb 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978CAIRO06277
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: OA 19840227
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: P850059-2094
Format: TEL
From: CAIRO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780210/aaaaaiez.tel
Line Count: 166
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 27bfcdcc-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 78 STATE 49705, 78 CAIRO 6274, 78 CAIRO 6202, 78 TEL AVIV 2577, 78 JERUSALEM 524, 78 STATE 29698
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3426928
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CHANGED> MCM 20040604
Subject: SADAT'S ORAL MESSAGE TO BEGIN
TAGS: PREL, PEPR, PBOR, EG, US, IS, XF, (SADAT, ANWAR), (BEGIN, MENACHEM)
To: JERUSALEM TEL AVIV MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/27bfcdcc-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014